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Contested experiences and potential justice at the limit of the law for 
poor urban children in Bangladesh 
This paper explores the issues of poor children’s criminality, violence and 
transgression in the context of slums in Bangladesh. It reworks theoretical 
understandings of the limits that are used to identify children and their 
transgressive acts in the law. The paper questions the use of the term 
“delinquent” children, their position and “diversion” from crime. It exposes the 
contested sense of margins that are part of geographies of criminality and 
childhood constructed in relation to existing orders, shared moralities and values 
in urban Bangladesh. Drawing on examples from research in slums and detention 
centres in Bangladesh, it highlights children’s experiences of limits, their 
responses to prohibitions and moral imperatives, and the relationship between 
order and excess in terms of language and proximity to others. The paper 
recognises the limitations of the existing collective order and seeks out 
possibilities for community and justice at the limit of the law. 
Keywords: criminality, violence, transgression, poverty, law, Bangladesh 
Introduction 
Critiques of the existing justice system in Bangladesh point to its inadequacy in 
addressing the “deviance” of children, who are defined in terms of their criminal 
activities and then “diverted” to a path of normality, as defined in the law (GOB 2013). 
As a result, poor children in Bangladesh are often treated as “waste”, subjected to 
increased policing and often harsh discipline, and rendered something akin to bare life 
(Katz 2011). There are three main concerns emerging from the treatment of poor 
children in the current justice system in Bangladesh that this paper aims to address. 
First, within the existing order urban poor children are often singled out by the police, 
who treat them as isolated individuals lacking support from their parents or community 
(Atkinson-Sheppard 2016). The child emerges as a formal category in the 2013 
Children’s Act and the Constitution, defined as a person under the age of 16 and in need 
of special legal protection (Ferdousi 2013, 23). However, the legal system in 
Bangladesh does not differentiate between a child as a perpetrator or a victim of a crime 
(UNICEF 2006, 13)1. Furthermore, broader meanings attached to childhood in 
Bangladeshi culture are multiple, which raises questions as to the appropriateness of this 
singular definition as a stable entity in the law (Harun-or-Rashid 2015).  
Second, judging poor children to be “delinquent” under the legal system does 
not often take into account neglect, abuse and violence within broader society and 
cannot be fully rationally justified. Children in Bangladesh are often driven into 
criminal activities by challenging experiences of poverty2, deteriorating public 
education, and socio-economic instability linked to persistent unemployment (World 
Youth Report 2003).  Children’s acts of vengeance against abusive parents such as the 
high-profile story of Oishee Rahman killing her mother and father are often described in 
terms of “madness”, thus questioning the clear boundaries between reason and unreason 
set out in the law (Daily Star 2015).  
Third, the legal system presumes a version of ethics based on the principle of 
utility and centrality of the subject: a child making rational decisions and entering into a 
contract with the broader community. In this context, the boundary between “a child” 
and “a community” is described in terms of com-unis, as being together as one, which 
                                                 
1 In many cases child victims of a crime are subject to detention in closed facilities, which 
means that they suffer at the hands of the perpetrator and then in detention. Police also use 
cursory classifications of criminality, arresting poor children on a variety of grounds, such as for 
vagrancy, being “incorrigible” or being exposed to moral danger (Atkinson-Sheppard 2016). 
2 Poverty in Bangladesh is described in relation to the level of per capita expenditure 
required to meet household’s basic needs (The World Bank, 2010; Shubin and Sowgat, 2018). 
According to the latest census, 31.5% of the population are living below the upper poverty line, 
while 54% of children are poor (ibid). 
assumes the existence of the regulated centre imposing sameness in the name of justice, 
or com-munis, as being bound by a specific moral contract or norms (Stanley 1998). 
However, the moral orders of the streets do not fit simply within the territory of 
normative ethics as described in the law. In Dhaka the boundary between “illicit” labour 
and crime is often blurred, so that poor children join gangs to feel empowered and 
believe themselves to be engaged in a sort of business, with “crime described as a 
normal and intrinsic part of Bangladeshi society” (Atkinson-Sheppard 2016, 239). In the 
slums, petty crime is often tolerated by the authorities, while seemingly unfair police 
action becomes tolerated as part of children’s learning to stay away from crime 
(Conticini 2005).   
To address these concerns, the paper draws on broader discussions on the 
possibility of “postmodern” jurisprudence in legal studies (Stanley 1998) and alternative 
ethics of care and justice (Barnett 2005) to explore the very process of classifying 
children as “delinquent”. It builds on the work of Georges Bataille to explore the 
possibility of different ethics and a “justice of alterity within communities of difference 
out-with the law” (Stanley 1998,155). Drawing on recent literature deploying Bataille’s 
ideas (Buur 2009, Groes-Green 2010) in Global South contexts and examples from 
fieldwork in slums and detention centres in Bangladesh, it challenges simplistic 
definitions of criminality and the boundaries of the law, and explores the possibility of 
justice in the community. 
 
Transgressions, boundaries and ethics 
Central to Bataille’s writing is the idea of communication, which offers opportunities to 
rethink subjectivity, violence, transgression and the limits of the law as it is applied to 
young people in Bangladesh. First, Bataille questions the division between inside and 
outside, and the limit as a definition of an isolated self. Similar to Heidegger, Bataille 
considers being as relational “being-with”, always situated with others in the world 
(Shubin 2015) and “outside” the limits set by the law. In Bataille’s terms, a human 
being is always incomplete without recognition from others, which requires going 
‘beyond’ set limits in communication with others in ‘an attempt to complete being’ 
(Bataille 1988a, 89). Bataille (1988a, 23) exposes the human being as being-multiple 
rather than being-one (conveniently defined as either a ‘child’ or a ‘criminal’), fractured 
within itself: “A being that isn’t cracked isn’t possible”. This understanding of a child as 
being-multiple redefines limits set in the law not as definitive boundaries but rather as 
openings to the world. Such an understanding of heterogeneous “becoming-childhoods” 
(Kraftl 2015) exceeds traditional boundaries in depicting children and suggests that their 
encounters with others are not always representable in terms of crime as it happens in 
Bangladesh.  
Furthermore, Bataille’s (1988b, 98) insistence that “existence is 
communication” challenges the idea of a subject distinct from the world. A human 
being is always already outside itself when, through communication, it brings the other 
into itself. The limit of the self here is the point of passage and not closure, reflective of 
open-ended theorisations of contemporary childhoods as collections of “unpredictable 
connections among materials and processes, forces and events” (Lee and Motzkau 2011, 
8). In this respect, the paper addresses recent calls to go beyond “child-centredness” 
(Spyrou, 2017) and engage with the heterogeneous, complex and “strange” (Aitken, 
2010) encounters with difference that shape childhood. Bataille (1988b, 118) describes 
this impossible relation as “the movement of painful communication… [going] no less 
from within to without, than from without to within”, thus pointing towards the futility 
of separations of subject and object in legal discourse.  
Second, Bataille’s insistence on the openness of being and communication 
challenges the boundaries between reason and unreason (knowledge and non-
knowledge), and redefines the limits of violence. Communicative existence involves 
reaching out beyond the self so that “everything in me gives itself to others” (Bataille 
1988b, 130). In children’s geographies, communication can be expressed in the form of 
affects, beyond an individual agent and “in excess of emotions, and located in bodily 
habits or the situational ‘atmospheres’ between actors” (Horton and Kraftl, 2006, 79). 
Here we draw on the definition of affect as a series of inhuman or pre-subjective forces 
and intensities’ (Spinks, 2001, p. 24) arising out of interactions between individual 
bodies and objects. Affects are manifold as they bring together multiple compositions of 
bodies, things and relations beyond a single subject, creating a sense of aliveness, 
vitality, changeability, and potential for interaction outside one specific individual 
(Thrift, 2004).  
With this understanding of affect a child can no longer be seen as an enclosed 
entity required for possession of knowledge. Bataille (1988b, 51) views communication 
as producing “non-knowledge” of intersubjective encounters that does not have the 
certainty of conceptually structured experience forming human knowledge based on 
reason and truth. What is emerging in Bataille’s communication is unknown not only 
because it cannot be factually pinpointed, but because it is “structurally unknowable” as 
it involves openness to alterity, things one cannot own and that are yet to come (Caputo, 
1997). Un-knowing disaccumulates and hollows out. It calls for an uncertain relation to 
the Other, appearing in the form of passion or faith, which Derrida (2014, 75) calls the 
“passion of non-knowing”. Instead of collecting facts that define violence and name a 
child as “delinquent” according to the law, communication with the Other alters a 
child’s relationship with herself and pushes it beyond any subjective capacity or 
knowledge. Blanchot (1993) calls this the “surprise” of Bataille’s language, which 
suspends the name of the subject (child) itself and refuses to privilege conceptuality. 
The turn to non-knowledge does violence to the logos of logic and “denounces the 
oppression of a coherence that takes on the role of law” (Blanchot, 1992, 117).  
Furthermore, Bataille’s (1998, 56) analysis of communication exposes the 
prohibitions and the law as unstable and not completely rational, “appealing not to a 
reason but to a feeling, just as violence is”.  This approach signals a shift from a 
negative understanding of transgression as a threat to limits happening outside the law 
(as seen in the Bangladeshi legal system) to a productive vision of transgression as a 
part of the law (there is no outside). In Bataille’s (1986, 63) view, the inside/outside 
boundaries of the law are undermined since permissions to cross the boundaries (“‘Thou 
shall not kill!’ Followed by a blessing on armies”) are themselves subject to the law. In 
this case, “the transgression does not deny the taboo [prohibition] but transcends it and 
completes it” (ibid., 63). In this context, a child’s crime that pays no attention to the 
prohibition or the law, either through unawareness or indifference, is never 
transgressive. Crime without understanding or justification, as Derrida (2014) would 
suggest, places the child outside of reason and clears her of guilt. On the other hand, if 
violence is based on reason and appeals to a code of law to make crime “meaningful, 
deliberate, calculated, premeditated, goal-oriented, it belongs to the order of penal 
justice” (ibid., 230). Violence as vengeance that can be explained rationally becomes a 
part of justice, thus encouraging further violence. In a society that is founded by 
violence both inside and outside the law crime becomes what Perec (1997) calls “infra-
ordinary”, not reduced to ordinary or extraordinary, both exception and the rule.  
Third, Bataille’s analysis of communication as ontology rather than 
epistemology focused around boundaries of reason/unreason complicates the difference 
between good and evil. Since communication destabilises the limits of the self, it 
questions the sense of authority that an individual can possess. Bataille contests Hegel’s 
treatment of sovereignty as productivity and recuperation of self, which provides the 
foundation for defining a sovereign as “he who decides on the exception” in political 
philosophy and in juridical theory (Schmitt 2005, 5). In contrast to the dichotomy 
between the slave and the master (the law, the sovereign), Bataille (1993, 193-194) 
claims that sovereignty “is the object which eludes us all, which nobody has seized and 
which nobody can seize for this reason: we cannot possess it, like an object”. In these 
terms, sovereignty is not simply about empowerment that young people living in a 
criminal environment in the Global South are claimed to possess by rebelling against 
authority (Groes-Green, 2010). On the contrary, communication involves giving oneself 
to the other, so sovereignty cannot be about appropriation or possession. Sovereignty 
signals movement beyond the order of representation, a passage into what Blanchot 
(1981, 6) calls “disappearance” or “effacement” of oneself. This is an appeal to an 
enigmatic non-agency and holding open the place for the Other in becoming anonymous 
(Fynsk, 2013). This sense of hospitality for the Other in a passivity, relinquishing one’s 
mastery and subjective power, eliminates a relation to one’s presence (as a self-
exception, it cannot be owned or lived). In communication, the release of excessive 
energies without calculation and recompense shatters the integrity of the sovereign, 
hence “sovereignty is NOTHING” (Bataille 1993, 193-194). The shift from a sovereign 
will of the law aligned towards utilitarian ends to the will to abandon and exposure to 
the other is best expressed by shared suffering or affliction governed by fatality; it is the 
“realm of failure” (ibid., 194). The affirmation of self-withdrawal indicates a break in 
the existing order of instrumental responsibility, infrastructure of laws and organised 
boundaries, which justify calculative practices of care (Barnett, 2005). 
At the same time, transgressive communication that is beyond the realm of 
reason is essentially amoral, indifferent and calls for a rethinking of utilitarian ethics. 
Bataille undermines utilitarian ethics that assume the possibility of a self-enclosed agent 
making autonomous, rational and reasonable choices within the boundaries of the law. 
As Mitchell and Winfree (2009, 71) note, by insisting on fidelity to communication, 
Bataille offers alternative ethics “without an object, desire for a Good beyond the good, 
a Good that cannot be located, reduced to a thing, acquired and turned into another 
thing”. In communication, beings are open to one another and to the ineffable, which 
cannot be mapped in relation to a “Good” or a “Bad”. As a result, such an ethics is not 
based on defining the originary violent moment in children’s lives as it happens in 
communication with the other and beyond their intentions. Instead, it calls for being 
open to the possibilities this excessive movement of communication brings, both 
spatially and temporally. An excessive ethics therefore demands a more compassionate 
sense of justice, which involves witnessing the ineffable and activating differences by 
sharing passions, suffering, and knowledge of human finitude at the limits of the social.  
 
Context 
 
We develop these conceptual ideas drawing on the six-month-long ethnographic study 
conducted in 2015 and 2017 in the Khulna region in Southern Bangladesh, which is an 
under-researched area with a significant number of recent cases of child delinquency 
and is also the site of one of the three child development (detention) centres in the 
country (Fig 1). In this region, 15.4% people live below the poverty line, with a large 
number of poor children particularly vulnerable to becoming involved in crime (The 
World Bank, 2010). Khulna and Jessore are two major cities in this region with a high 
proportion of their area covered by slum settlements (18% and 15%, respectively, 
Fortuny et al., 2011). In these cities, 31% of police cases falsely allege children to be 
“in conflict with the law” (UNICEF 2006)3, which undermines the clear boundaries of 
delinquency in the legal system (Sowgat et al, 2015). Furthermore, out of 11,155 
children in the slums of these cities surveyed during previous research, only 73.5% were 
able to show their birth certificate, thus undermining the age-based definition of a 
“child” (ibid.).  
The study used desk reviews of media articles on child delinquency, as well as 
interviews and focus group discussions with poor children, parents, criminal justice 
practitioners and community members. 16 children were involved in this study, all boys 
between the ages of 10 and 16. We conducted several in-depth recurrent interviews with 
each of them (lasting for about 1 hour) in Bangla (later translated by the authors) in the 
community-based child protection and development centres, with the children’s 
guardians present during the conversations. On top of this, we conducted 18 in-depth 
interviews in Bangla with police and probation officers, lawyers, NGO activists, and 
detention centre staff each lasting for about 1 hour. The researchers received police 
clearance to work with children and access sensitive information, and followed ethical 
procedure focusing on anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent, voluntary 
participation, minimising harm and avoiding exploitation of participants. On top of this, 
the researchers tried to detect hidden value biases, moral logic and conflicting moral 
obligations, especially in relation to the application of the law to children’s actions. Part 
of our ethical commitment was to develop broader moral imaginations which could 
                                                 
3 The term ‘children in conflict with the law’ refers to anyone under 18 who comes into 
contact with the justice system as a result of being suspected or accused of committing an 
offence (UNICEF, 2006). 
provide insights into the challenges facing poor children living in a complex web of 
moral relationships (Hay 1998). Furthermore, 9 focus groups were held with children’s 
parents, younger and older children, NGO activists and community members to 
generate a cross-sectional understanding of the critical issues around child delinquency, 
boundaries of normality, criminality and violence, transgression, risk and justice. All 
names used are pseudonyms. 
 
Incomplete subjectivity and boundaries of criminality 
 
In Bangladesh the assumed subject of a child in the dominant cultural (as protected) and 
legal (age-dependent) discourses is expressed as a singular and stable entity. A lawyer 
in Jessore testified: 
“In the station, police would often determine age by looking at the faces of 
children. The children would not normally have birth certificates. They were often 
misjudged in terms of age. Consequently, because of his appearance a child would 
be treated as an adult in the lock up and in the court.” (Ara) 
 
Here the police are concerned with the appearance of the child, striving to 
stabilise his identity so he becomes a subject of the law and rationalised as “deviant”.  
Such orderings are particularly problematic since they do not reflect the complexity of 
children’s lives, openness to the future and other people. On the one hand, the 
experiences of poor children undermine the limitations to subjectivity expressed in the 
law. For example, a boy in a Rupsha Slum in Khulna expresses conflicting experiences 
of incompleteness in his life: 
“People would want us, the children, to be inside the house and act like gentlemen, 
no arguments with anyone, and very fragile. However, life is far more difficult for 
me and many others like me. We did not get any love from our father. We had to 
start working to support the family and we were exposed to the cruel world.” 
(Sohel) 
 
As this quote suggests, the child subject is expected to hold together 
contradictory aspects of his life, trying to reconcile the need to be cared for and provide 
for the family. Moreover, this highlights “exposure to the cruel world” as a necessary 
condition of being such a child, which exceeds the boundaries of a singular entity. In 
Bataille’s (1988b) terms, such exposure disrupts the limits of the law that defines the 
child as an autonomous subject and points to the insufficiency of being a child often 
judged as a deviant. A child in Jessore’s detention centre reflected on being close to 
death in police custody: 
Interviewer: Do they treat you the same as other children? 
Momin: By ‘other’ do you mean to say, children who are not engaged in crime? If 
that is the case, surely they treat us very different… I experienced electric shocks, 
beating, abusive language in police custody… They were doing evil things that I 
cannot tell you. I was so shocked and was so startled. I told them: “Don’t you have 
any son or daughter? How can you do this to me?”  I was scared and thought I 
would die.” 
 
By stressing the child’s relationship to death, this example illustrates the sense 
of breaking the boundaries of the subject that is beyond an accepted authority of morals. 
It shows the disappearance of the subject of a protected and innocent child, where a 
child oversteps his bounds and reaches out towards the other (all sons and daughters).  
On the other hand, relational understanding of a child as always “being-with” 
others reformulates taken-for-granted boundaries describing children’s singular identity 
and order. In particular, friendship means a lot for children in slums, as one child in 
Jessore explains: 
“I would often go with my friends at night and roam around. They wanted me to 
take drugs, encouraging me every day. I had to accept this because, if I did not do 
so, they would not let me be with them. I knew I was getting addicted and it would 
be bad but did not want to leave my friends... I had to take the risk of being 
arrested.” (Jibon) 
 
Here group membership requires communication and contact with what is other 
(drugs), which risks the child’s independent existence. A child is caught in the public 
world of being-with others, where he cannot remain immune to others’ influences. In 
Bataille’s (1988b, xxxiii) terms, a relational understanding of the child’s being implies 
openness to the outside in “the play of the isolation and the dissolution of beings”. 
Bringing in the foreign substance (drugs) challenges the boundaries of inside and 
outside, normality and deviance. A boy in Sonadanga Slum in Khulna testifies:  
“I took a few bottles of Fensi [a drug], things went very foggy… I did not think 
about crime, I just thought that I had to do this to keep my friendship with the 
others. When we were short of money for drugs, we had to snatch money from 
houses to support our habit.” (Orup) 
 
In this situation, communication as a relation of exposure opens up the world 
beyond the child’s control as he starts taking drugs and he is pushed to steal money to 
support his habit. Although drug dependence is often seen as a pathway to crime 
(Atkinson-Sheppard 2016), the above example also stresses the child’s unstable position 
as a developing being-with others whose relation to criminality is not certain (“things 
went foggy”). The legal discourse tends to overlook the violence intrinsic to 
communication when one “participates in suicide” and loses one’s integrity (Bataille 
1992, 26). The experience of taking drugs introduces new materials and forces that 
transform the child, taking away his control over himself and making him further 
dependent on the group. Communication cracks open his identity, putting him at risk: 
“it requires individuals whose separate existence in themselves is risked” (Bataille 
1992, 19). Such exposure and dislocation of the self creates what Bataille (1998b, 27) 
terms the “fusion of the subject and the object”.  
As this section has demonstrated, an understanding of being as multiple 
challenges the boundaries of inside and outside as traditionally expressed in the law. 
The other ruptures a child’s identity and moves the outside to the inside, thus 
undermining the normative politics that present a child as an independent rational actor. 
With the developing subject that cannot be reduced to an isolated self, the limits in legal 
discourse are also becoming blurred, undermining the attempts to name and represent a 
child as “deviant”. This dislocation of the self makes it impossible to clearly name a 
child a “criminal” or a “victim”, thus challenging the processes of rationalisation for 
classifying violence, which we consider in the next section. 
 
Transgression, violence and the limits of reason 
Uncertainty about the evolving subject brings into question the kind of knowledge that 
is usually exhibited around normality, deviance and crime. On the one hand, affective 
engagements create intersubjective relationships between a child and others that escape 
rational representation. Affects relate to corporeal, sensuous, expressive being that 
exceed individual feelings. One of the children in the Railway Slum in Khulna spoke 
about his pre-reflective actions that cannot be simply classified: 
“I went to someone’s house to pick tamarinds from a tree. And then I used a toilet 
since it was open and empty. Just before leaving, I saw a kitchen tap open, water 
wasted and I was pushed to close it, so many people suffer without water in my 
community! That was when the house owner caught me and took me to the police”. 
(Rony) 
 
This quote describes an emotional response of a child to running water, preceded 
by what the police described as trespassing in a property. The “suffering” of others (that 
we will also revisit later) hit a child and created resonance with the broader community 
without water. This situation does not lend itself to a simple interpretation drawing on 
the order of subjects and concepts. Even the investigating police officers in this case 
were concerned that the owner of the house treated the child too harshly, since it is 
culturally accepted for small children to collect ripe fruits from the trees. This tension 
between the legal discourse, common understanding and a spontaneous response 
highlights the fact that a child’s experience cannot fit into intellectual or moral 
categories imposed from without. In Bataille’s (1988a) terms, communication between 
a child and a “suffering” other expresses the volatile experience of being “outside” 
oneself so the sense of self-enclosure of the subject required for the appropriation of 
knowledge is lost. Communication as a part of intersubjective encounters produces 
“non-knowledge”, different from the certainty and regularity of knowledge based on 
reason. Affective interactions question the “order of representations, or whether they are 
good or bad” (Stewart 2007, 5) and create a gap in rational reasoning. A child from 
Jessore Detention centre spoke about such compelling forces that are more than 
rational: 
Raju: “I killed my uncle. He was very bad and did bad things to me. It lasted and 
lasted, but I could not say anything as me and my mum would be kicked out of the 
house. I was ashamed of myself, so I started taking drugs. I felt that I was also 
implicating myself in wrongdoing [homosexual act] against the will of God. One 
night when I was abused again, it hit me. I did not know what it was, I just took a 
big knife and killed him. 
Interviewer: Did you realise that you committed a crime? 
Raju: I had to do it, after all the things he did to me.” 
 
This quote reflects the unbearable and sudden burst of energy, which comes 
before rational thinking. It is a reaction of a child to visceral suffering that created the 
potential for change. The act of killing draws on “hybrid, bastard, or even corrupted 
reasoning . . . ‘as in a dream’” (Derrida 1995, 90), where a child is moved by an 
ineffable force (“it hit me”) to end his ordeal. Even though the court sentenced this child 
for premeditated murder, both his systematic abuse and reactions to it are outside of a 
legal discourse and religious norms (where homosexuality is prohibited). This example 
also exposes the prohibitions as not completely reasonable. In Bataille’s (1986, 36) 
view, a child’s reaction to violent deeds “opens a passage between reason and unreason 
linking together what seems impossible to reconcile, [namely] respect for the law and 
violation of the law; the taboo and its transgression”.   
On the other hand, children’s troubled living also brings into a question the 
meaning of transgression. According to Derrida (2014), crime that pays no attention to 
prohibitions does not belong to the order of penal justice. A child from the T.B. Cross 
Road slum in Khulna reflects on transgression that does not quite fit within the 
definitions of criminality: 
“I was arrested for stealing pigeons in other people’s houses. But I love pigeons! I 
don't think stealing a bird was a theft. I do it for the love of birds. I would go to 
different houses and steal pigeons…These days people call me ‘the pigeon lover’, 
but the police arrested me and tried to “divert” me from crime, but how can I live if 
I do not have my love for birds?” (Irfan) 
  
The child’s love for birds here reflects an obsession with another living being 
and challenges negative meanings attached to transgression. For Bataille, transgression 
is not oppositional or disruptive as it does not challenge pre-defined ethical limits – 
instead, it constructs the world by creating excess at the limit of discursive thought. The 
child’s actions were seen as absurd and insignificant by the police, who struggled to 
give meanings to his acts and provide signification in the code of law beyond the term 
“theft”. As one of the police officers in Khulna claimed,  
“Children do things without knowing that this would be a serious crime. They 
simply don’t know how to balance the advice of the elders, street culture and the 
police’s interpretation of a crime.” (Salam) 
 
In this case, the perceived crime of a child exceeds the bounds of the rational 
and his actions exceed the definitions of the law, of homogenization and justification.  
To summarise, this section challenged the totality and certainty of knowledge 
about criminality in the legal discourse. It demonstrated that different forms of affective 
knowledge and of not-knowing produce the situations that make children human – the 
events beyond the representations of “criminality” and the limits of reason. In contexts 
where society is founded by violence (“guaranteed by crime”, Bataille 1992, 18), reason 
alone cannot define the changing limits. As a result, the category of “transgression” 
itself needs to be reconsidered not as a negative act or an opposition to the law, but as 
often unintentional, uncertain being in place that exceeds representation. Importantly, a 
transgression that is not only rational and involves reaching towards the other also 
offers the possibility of different ethics beyond the limit of the law, which we now turn 
to. 
 Alternative ethics and judgement 
 
Unstable and multiple subjectivities emerge in the world of prohibitions that appear 
irrational and beckon instability. On the one hand, children’s experiences in Bangladesh 
question the idea of sovereignty as expressed in the law. Children are often judged to be 
consciously turning transgression into celebrations of inverted moral orders to achieve 
sovereignty as power (Jenks 2003). However, for many poor children, involvement in 
violence is not driven by utility and it does not lead to possession of power (Sowgat et 
al., 2015). Instead, it is about loss and destruction, as a boy from Jessore’s detention 
centre explains: 
“As a member of the gang, people respect me, but I have lost a lot. I can no longer 
just be a child, people treat me as a criminal. I could not go and play with my 
friends without worrying. I am always scared of being arrested. I have to listen to 
gang leaders, I can no longer do things by myself. I feel suspended, somewhere 
else, ‘sold out’ to the gang.” (Jalil)  
 
Here the sovereignty is without mastery since it involves giving oneself to the 
other (being “suspended”) without achieving a sense of superiority, so it does not 
threaten the limits of the law. Bataille (1993, 194) claims that it cannot be thought of in 
terms of achievement, so “never can we be sovereign”. The event of sovereign abandon 
is not reducible to the conceptual determination in the form of “deviance” or 
“criminality”; it is outside the binaries of good and evil. Instead, the child’s experiences 
of suffering and loss of childhood go beyond the order of the law and reveal the patterns 
of exclusion rife in Bangladeshi society. 
On the other hand, children’s transgressions question the moral basis of the 
existing social order. A child in Ward 6 in Jessore questions the ethics of the police 
response to his actions:  
“The police do not bother too much about rights of children. They convict us even 
before anything happens simply because they assume we did something wrong, 
like being out at night. They often beat us in the van while taking us to the station 
to discipline us! You get no mercy as a child.” (Ali) 
 
Almost in response to this, a criminal justice practitioner in Khulna justifies the 
existing ethics of the police: 
“Often police beat children up and then let them go. I think this is more effective 
than to send them to jail or convict them. Yes, this is unfair, but the children are 
given a lesson. They are afraid to break the law again. They would be fearful, 
remembering the suffering and not dare to commit a crime again.” (Kalam) 
 
Although children’s transgressive acts are identified in terms of criminality, they 
are not intrinsically good or bad as they stand outside reason and beyond the code, so 
that they can be considered amoral. Bataille (1962, 127) insists that “evil is not 
transgression, it is transgression condemned”, so that children’s actions only become 
subversive and negative when they are related to norms and moral ideas about 
“usefulness”. The criminal justice practitioner uses the binaries of opposition and 
negation to express children’s “misconduct”, shaped by calculations of interest for the 
good of the community. However, Bataille explores a possibility of justice and 
community beyond the law, when individuals push life to the limit that is death. In this 
excessive moment of communication, one exposes herself to the exceptional, the other, 
puts herself and the other in the region of death (Mitchell and Winfree 2009). A boy in 
Khulna’s Basupara slum states: 
“The police hung me upside down, beating me to death. I was losing myself and 
looked death in the face, but I lived. This moment changed my life. I suddenly 
thought about all the other children who were in my place, suffering from the 
police. Now I do not see crime as doing something wrong. Everyone is doing 
something wrong, even the police. If you are made to suffer, where is the 
difference between right and wrong?” (Abir) 
 
A child here speaks about a moment of “seeing death” and being open to 
otherness. He confronts the impossible, an “unexperienced experience” that is dying 
(Derrida 2000, 45). This experience at the limit of existence is beyond individual and 
outside language – it is indescribable. The encounter with death opens onto the 
experience of suffering that is measureless (it involves “all other children”) and 
establishes co-belonging in a community of affliction. Since it transgresses the limits of 
the terms “good” or “evil”, it is essentially amoral. In this moment, shared passion is 
transgressive and it allows for the development of a different relation to others in what 
Blanchot (2000, 5) calls “a compassion for suffering humanity”. Communication is ek-
cstatic (it stands out, Ekstatikon), it goes beyond the limits imposed by the law and 
offers a possibility of sharing that is not determined by calculation or the restricted 
economy of meaning. 
Rethinking ethics with Bataille suggests the importance of being attentive to the 
moment that involves communication at the limits of the language. A police officer in 
Khulna explains: 
“It is very wrong that the police are brutal. I found three kids carrying drugs on a 
railway line. I searched them, found that they were carrying cannabis, and they 
were being used as drug transporters. I used to be like these kids, violent and 
abandoned by my parents, so I did not arrest them. I then contacted their parents 
through the local city councillor and talked to them.” (Salam) 
 
This example presents a policeman as someone affected by loss, who has been 
in a position of abandonment and exposed to the harsh realities of life on the street, and 
who has accepted that other in himself. Instead of ethics limited to moral ideas about the 
best ways of achieving the greater good, he considers the possibility of a just 
community that shares incompleteness and hospitality for the other – sharing of 
themselves and the sharing of others. As Nancy (1991, 25) comments, Bataille’s 
thinking offers the possibility of a community “constituted by ... sharing that makes 
them others: others for one another, and other”.  
To summarise, this section explored possibilities for sovereignty as absence and 
withdrawal at the limits of the law. With the disappearance of the subject as a part of 
being-in-common, sovereignty cannot be expressed through utilitarian ends achieved 
through work and reason. If sovereignty is about no-thing and beyond interpretation and 
value, then the logic of interiority and exteriority governing dominant morality is false, 
and the notion of “good” measured against usefulness needs to be abandoned.  
Normative ethics cannot express the diversity of children’s experiences and life events 
that have emerged independently of their intentions. This section explored possibilities 
for an alternative ethics of hope with the determining commitment to alterity and a just 
community that shares incompleteness, loss and hospitality for the other. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In line with the broader themes of this special issue, our paper re-examined the ways in 
which boundaries for naming poor delinquent children are drawn in the Bangladeshi 
legal system. Firstly, drawing on Bataille’s idea of communication, we questioned the 
boundaries of an isolated child as a stable and dependent entity in the law and exposed 
the limit as a point of passage and proximity with others as a part of being-in-common. 
We challenged the illusions of rationalised exchange that inform policies of diverting 
children from delinquency with the expectations of moving them “outside” crime. In so 
doing, we destabilised the notion of a child as “waste” (Katz, 2011), which requires 
containment and imposition of boundaries as a form of accumulation by dispossession 
(from education, from knowledge, from the future). By being made disposable in a 
system based on exchange value and commodification, poor children in Bangladesh are 
often pushed towards famine, debilitating work and street gangs, thus reinforcing their 
positions as deviants and outsiders. Drawing on examples from the cultural politics of 
the everyday, we unsettled the binaries of centre/margins, deviant/normal and 
victim/criminal in the law. Following Smith (2003, 307), we called for more attention to 
the ontological units that support definitions of criminality and encourage focus not on 
“universalizable ‘subjects’, but variable processes of subjectivation; not the ‘whole’, the 
‘one’ or ‘objects’, but rather “knots of totalization” held together by the power relations 
within the Bangladeshi state.  
 
Secondly, our paper challenged the logic of un/reason used to draw the limits of 
normality in the legal discourse. We questioned representations of poor children as 
unreasonable due to their transgressing the limits of the social order and offered 
examples of alternative ways for children to engage with the world. Children’s affective 
communication drew attention to the ineffable, inter-subjective and more-than-rational 
relations with their surroundings that are not a matter of knowledge drawing an external 
authority (language). Communication that goes beyond the limit of language is outside 
of rational knowledge and demands for acknowledgement. In Derrida’s (1995, 90) 
terms, such interactions cannot belong to discourse as they are “beyond categories, and 
above all beyond categorical oppositions, which in the first place allow it to be 
approached”. As a result, we questioned the negativity of transgression as belonging to 
the law and challenged the oppositions and limits that it is expected to create. A sense of 
uncertainty about the prohibitions that draw on often specious justification and 
supported by emotional responses to violence was apparent in the stories from the 
correctional system. Fieldwork examples challenged negative morality and 
consideration of a delinquent child as a passive agent outside the law, who is 
condemned for transgressing the boundaries of prohibitions only to maintain the societal 
order. 
Finally, our paper questioned the ethical boundaries of calculative rationality 
applied to poor children in Bangladesh. Moving beyond the order of representation, we 
explored the relationship between sovereignty and transgression at the limit of the law. 
If sovereignty is taken as mastery, it is subject to the corruption of reason and justifies 
the ethics aligned towards utilitarian ends and binaries of good/evil, normal/deviant. 
Children’s testimonies illustrated their experiences of lack that the law attempted to 
complete in its desire for sameness, with the police officers judging children’s actions in 
terms of difference that needs to be normalised. However, children’s desires are 
multiple and are not driven by the deliberate, calculative choices of an isolated 
individual, and we need to move beyond the humanist ethical model of an agentic child 
(Spyrou, 2017). By focusing on sovereignty as sacrifice and withdrawal, the paper 
followed Bataille’s thinking in his re-evaluation of justice and normative ethics. It 
explored justice at the limit of the law and society that builds on an ethics of alterity and 
proximity to others that is not limited to moral ideas about the best ways of achieving 
the greater good. This approach goes along with recent developments in children’s 
geographies calling for an alternative ethics of encounter with the ineffable through 
congregational practices (Rautio, 2013) or play-full-ness (Christensen et al., 2018), 
which defies the boundaries of reason and appears as silly or foolish. As our discussion 
suggested, the possibility of alternative ethics emerges through the sharing of passion, 
abandonment of calculative interests and opening a place for the strangeness of the 
other. 
Commitment to such an ethics requires re-interpretation of the legal boundaries 
imposed on urban poor children in Bangladesh. Paraphrasing Baudrillard (1981,129), 
“deviant” children are often made to say that they are not deviant, “that bestiality, 
savagery – with what these terms imply of unintelligibility, radical strangeness to reason 
[non-knowledge] – do not exist, but on the contrary the most bestial behaviours, the 
most singular, the most abnormal are resolved in science” and the law. Instead of 
simply attempting to fit the diversity of children’s “challenging” behaviours or erasing 
their perceived abnormality within the law, our efforts can perhaps be better spent 
trying to make their experiences speak in ways that escape conceptual determination. It 
is an opportunity, as Katz (2011) suggests, to consider the pleasures of “doing nothing”, 
the joys and passions of expectation and not knowing what is to come – indeterminable, 
surprising and unforeseeable. This may involve engaging with the “non-knowledge” 
that can help to elucidate the meaning of children’s actions and the intentions of others 
in the way their lives continue to develop. As such, it is a possibility for making room 
for the faith in what is to come, and being differently attuned to the unexpected 
“childhood” worlds that can develop (Caputo, 1997). As much as a call for patience and 
waiting, it is also an opportunity to appreciate uncertainty, playfulness and the 
experimental time of not-knowing that never lets itself be attained in terms of value, 
waste or productivity (Katz, 2011). It is not a learned or reasonable not-knowing, but an 
openness to alternative senses (affliction, passion pushed to its limits) and a reservoir 
not yet uncovered (Young, 2000, 196).  
In this context, the troubles and excitements experienced by poor children can 
reveal the inadequacies of the existing order and question the moral basis of a normative 
life in Bangladeshi society. The possibility of justice in the community comes through 
shared suffering and passion beyond the boundaries of a singular being (policeman, 
judge) that produces compassionate responses. In this context, care for children calls for 
selfless responsibility: giving oneself without reserve, mastery and determined 
calculation, and abandonment of the fixation with the origins of violence that in itself is 
foundational for Bangladeshi society as a whole. 
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